Working Paper: NBER ID: w30541
Authors: Kevin Dano; Francesco Ferlenga; Vincenzo Galasso; Caroline Le Pennec; Vincent Pons
Abstract: In theory, free and fair elections can improve the selection of politicians and incentivize them to exert effort. In practice, incumbency advantage and coordination issues may lead to the (re)election of bad politicians. We ask whether these two forces compound each other. Using a regression discontinuity design in French two-round local and parliamentary elections, we find that winning an election increases candidates' chances to win the next election by 25.1 percentage points. Close winners are more likely to run again and more likely to win, conditional on running, than close losers. Incumbents personalize their campaign communication more and face fewer ideologically close competitors, indicating that parties coordinate more effectively on the winning side than on the losing side. A complementary RDD reveals that marginally qualifying for the runoff also enables candidates to rally new voters, but does not affect the number of competitors on their side. We conclude that party coordination and voters rallying candidates who won or gained visibility in an election both contribute to their success in future races, even absent any actual difference in quality with candidates on the losing side.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: D72; K16
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Winning an election (K16) | Chances of winning the next election (D79) |
| Close winners (D44) | Likelihood of running again (C41) |
| Close winners (D44) | Probability of winning conditional on running (C25) |
| Winning (D44) | Enhanced party coordination (D79) |
| Marginally qualifying for the runoff (D79) | Future vote shares (D72) |
| Incumbents (G18) | Personalized campaign communication (D79) |
| Incumbents (G18) | Fewer ideologically close competitors (D79) |