Working Paper: NBER ID: w30539
Authors: Mark Buntaine; Michael Greenstone; Guojun He; Mengdi Liu; Shaoda Wang; Bing Zhang
Abstract: We conducted a nationwide field experiment in China to evaluate the direct and indirect impacts of assigning firms to public or private citizen appeals when they violate pollution standards. There are three main findings. First, public appeals to the regulator through social media substantially reduce violations and pollution emissions, while private appeals cause more modest environmental improvements. Second, public appeals appear to tilt regulators’ focus away from facilitating economic growth and toward avoiding pollution-induced public unrest. Third, pollution reductions by treated firms are not offset by control firms, based on randomly varying the proportion of treatment firms at the prefecture-level.
Keywords: Citizen Participation; Environmental Governance; Pollution Standards; China
JEL Codes: K32; P28; Q52
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Public appeals to regulators via social media (M38) | Shift in regulators' focus from economic growth to addressing public dissatisfaction (E69) |
| Reductions in violations by treated firms (L10) | No negative impact on control firms (G34) |
| Public appeals to regulators via social media (M38) | Reduction in pollution violations (Q52) |
| Public appeals to regulators via social media (M38) | Reduction in emissions (Q52) |
| Visibility of public appeals (likes/shares) (D16) | Heightened regulatory responses (G18) |
| Public appeals to regulators via social media (M38) | Enhanced regulatory oversight and compliance (G38) |