Working Paper: NBER ID: w30326
Authors: Filippo Lancieri; Eric A. Posner; Luigi Zingales
Abstract: Antitrust enforcement in the United States has declined since the 1960s. Building on several new datasets, we argue that this decline did not reflect a popular demand for weaker enforcement or any other kind of democratic sanction. The decline was engineered by unelected regulators and judges who, with a few exceptions, did not express skepticism about antitrust law in confirmation hearings. We find little evidence that academic ideas played an important role in the decline of antitrust enforcement except where they coincided with the interests of big business, which appears to have exercised influence behind the scenes.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: K21; L40; P16
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| regulatory and judicial decisions (K23) | decline of antitrust enforcement (L49) |
| academic ideas aligned with business interests (M14) | decline of antitrust enforcement (L49) |
| regulatory discretion (K20) | decline of antitrust enforcement (L49) |
| big business lobbying (K20) | Chicago School thinking influence (B13) |
| Chicago School principles (B13) | market outcomes (P42) |