Precautionary Protectionism

Working Paper: NBER ID: w30300

Authors: Sharon Traiberman; Martin Rotemberg

Abstract: We develop a dynamic extension of Dornbusch et al. (1977) with “rustiness”: the home country has relatively higher unit costs tomorrow for goods it is not producing today. We solve for optimal tariff policy when there is a potential for a crisis: an increase in demand for goods produced abroad. Optimally, the home planner never protects goods where comparative advantage is sufficiently low, not even the goods directly affected by the crises. However, for marginally competitive goods, the optimal policy trades off comparative advantage and demand. The extent of industrial policy is non-monotonic in both the size of the demand shock and in its variance.

Keywords: No keywords provided

JEL Codes: F13; O25


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
comparative advantage (F11)protectionist policy (F52)
increased demand (J23)tariffs (F13)
size of demand shock (E39)extent of industrial policy (L52)
variance of demand shock (E39)extent of industrial policy (L52)
size of demand shock (E39)protectionism (F52)

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