Working Paper: NBER ID: w30266
Authors: Marta Lachowska; Isaac Sorkin; Stephen A. Woodbury
Abstract: We use administrative data to quantify the employer’s role in unemployment insurance (UI) take-up. First, there are employer effects in both claiming and appeals, and, consistent with deterrence effects, these are negatively correlated. Second, low-wage workers are less likely to claim and more likely to have their claims appealed than median-wage workers, and employer effects explain a large share of these income gradients. Third, high-claiming and low-appealing employers are desirable employers: they are higher-paying and have lower separation rates. Finally, the dominant source of targeting error in the UI system is that eligible workers do not apply. Our findings emphasize a novel dimension of the role of employers in the labor market, and have implications for the financing of UI.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: H32; J30
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Reforms reducing experience rating (J48) | Targeting errors in UI system (C52) |
| Employer-specific effects (J29) | Claiming UI benefits (J65) |
| Employer-specific effects (J29) | Rate of appeals (K41) |
| Low-wage workers (J39) | Claiming UI benefits (J65) |
| Low-wage workers (J39) | Rate of appeals (K41) |
| High-claiming, low-appealing employers (J29) | Desirability of employers (J23) |
| Employer effects on claims (J65) | Employer effects on appeals (J65) |
| Increased appeals by employers (J65) | Claiming UI benefits (J65) |
| Employers with below-median claim effects (J79) | UI claim rate (J65) |
| Employer contraction rates (J39) | Separation eligible workers (J63) |