Right-to-Work Laws, Unionization and Wage Setting

Working Paper: NBER ID: w30098

Authors: Nicole Fortin; Thomas Lemieux; Neil Lloyd

Abstract: This paper uses two complementary approaches to estimate the effect of right-to-work (RTW) laws on wages and unionization rates. The first approach uses an event study design to analyze the impact of the adoption of RTW laws in five U.S. states since 2011. The second approach relies on a differential exposure design that exploits the differential impact of RTW laws on industries with high unionization rates relative to industries with low unionization rates. Both approaches indicate that RTW laws lower wages and unionization rates. Under the assumption that RTW laws only affect wages by lowering the unionization rate, RTW can be used as an instrumental variable (IV) to estimate the causal effect of unions on wages. In our preferred specification based on the differential exposure design, the IV estimate of the effect of unions on wages is 0.35, which substantially exceeds the corresponding OLS estimate of 0.16. This large wage effect suggests that RTW may also directly affect wages due to a reduced union threat effect.

Keywords: No keywords provided

JEL Codes: J31; J51; J83


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
unions (J51)wages (J31)
RTW laws (K31)lower wages (J31)
RTW laws (K31)reduced unionization rates (J58)
RTW laws (K31)wages (J31)

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