Working Paper: NBER ID: w29991
Authors: Lee J. Alston; Bernardo Mueller
Abstract: Countries are not equally developed in large part because most countries face sets of property rights that do not foster growth despite the aggregate gains that would result from changing property rights. The difference in rents to society between the extant set of property rights and some seemingly better alternative we define as a “Demsetz” wedge. We explore the forces that sustain the status quo as well the forces that prompt property rights to change.
Keywords: property rights; economic growth; transaction costs; political economy
JEL Codes: N00; O1
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| inclusive property rights (P14) | economic growth (O49) |
| transaction costs (D23) | inclusive property rights (P14) |
| elites and interest groups (D72) | transaction costs (D23) |
| transaction costs (D23) | evolution of property rights (P14) |
| political landscape (D72) | evolution of property rights (P14) |