Working Paper: NBER ID: w29965
Authors: Matias Iaryczower; Sergio Montero; Galileu Kim
Abstract: Democratic representation is constrained by the alternatives available to voters. In this paper, we develop a methodology to gauge the extent to which the “supply side” of politics hinders voter welfare. Using rich data on thousands of candidates in three Brazilian legislative elections, we quantify the relative value voters place on candidates’ policy positions and non-ideological attributes, and we evaluate voters’ welfare given the set of candidates they face. Our estimates uncover substantial welfare losses to voters relative to three alternative benchmarks of ideal representation. On average, the typical voter suffers only a moderate loss due to policy incongruence but a large loss due to shortages in candidates’ non-ideological characteristics. To evaluate the welfare consequences of potential institutional reforms, we develop and estimate a model of equilibrium policy determination. Through counterfactual experiments, we show that institutional reforms aimed at improving the quality of representation may have sizable unintended consequences due to equilibrium policy adjustments.
Keywords: democratic representation; voter welfare; institutional reform; Brazilian elections
JEL Codes: C13; C57; D72
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
Cause | Effect |
---|---|
candidate characteristics (D79) | voter welfare (K16) |
candidate shortages (J23) | voter welfare (K16) |
non-ideological characteristics of candidates (D79) | welfare losses (D69) |
institutional reforms (O17) | changes in voter welfare outcomes (K16) |
policy divergence (F68) | welfare loss (D69) |