Working Paper: NBER ID: w29924
Authors: James A. Robinson
Abstract: Despite the low levels of taxation and public good provision in Africa, I provide evidence that a large proportion of Africans prefer lower taxation and fewer public goods. This cannot be explained by standard arguments about problems of accountability, governance or state capacity. Instead I argue that it reflects deeply seated ideas about the nature of the state and its potential threats to the autonomy of society. I show the historic social contracts in Africa rarely featured taxation and kept the state to limited jurisdictions. These social contracts have in many ways reproduced themselves and influence the way Africa is governed today.
Keywords: Taxation; Social Contract; Africa; Public Goods
JEL Codes: H11; O1; O11
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| historical social contracts (B15) | tax aversion (H26) |
| historical context (B15) | tax aversion (H26) |
| small-scale polities (P26) | skepticism towards centralized authority (D73) |
| skepticism towards centralized authority (D73) | tax aversion (H26) |
| historical context (B15) | contemporary attitudes (P17) |
| historical social contracts (B15) | preference for lower taxation (H29) |
| historical social contracts (B15) | resistance to taxation (H26) |