Working Paper: NBER ID: w29797
Authors: Andrew D. Foster; Mark R. Rosenzweig
Abstract: We show using a theoretical framework that embeds a voting model in a general-equilibrium model of a rural economy with two interest groups defined by land ownership that the effects of democratization—a shift from control of public resources by the landed elite to a democratic regime with universal suffrage—on the portfolio of public goods is heterogeneous, depending the population landless. In accord with the model and empirical findings from micro data on the differing material interests of the two land classes, we find, based on 30-year panel data describing the democratization of Indian villages, that democratization in villages with a larger landless population share shifted resources away from public irrigation, secondary schools, and electrification and towards programs that increase employment. When the landed farmers have a large population share, public resources were shifted towards irrigation, secondary schools and electrification and away from employment programs.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: D72; H41; O1; O13; O40
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Democratization (O17) | Shift towards employment programs in villages with larger landless population (J68) |
| Democratization (O17) | Increased allocations for irrigation, secondary schools, and electrification in villages with larger landowner population (Q15) |
| Relative population shares of landowners and landless (Q15) | Composition of public goods under different governance regimes (H42) |
| Landless population share (J69) | Affects public goods allocation (H49) |