Working Paper: NBER ID: w29772
Authors: Leander Heldring; James A. Robinson; Sebastian Vollmer
Abstract: We use a dataset of the entire population of English Parliamentary enclosure acts between 1750 and 1830 to provide the first evidence of their impact. Parliamentary enclosure led to the systematic rationalization of traditional property rights. Exploiting a feature of the Parliamentary process that produced such legislation as a source of exogenous variation, we show that such enclosures were associated with significantly higher crop yields, but also higher land inequality. Our results are in line with a literature going back to Arthur Young and Karl Marx on the effects of Parliamentary enclosure on productivity and inequality. They do not support the argument that informal systems of governance, even in small, cohesive, and stable communities, were able to efficiently allocate commonly used and governed resources.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: D01; N5; O43
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Parliamentary enclosure (Q15) | Agricultural yield (Q11) |
| Parliamentary enclosure (Q15) | Land inequality (D31) |
| Parliamentary enclosure (Q15) | Improved agricultural practices (Q16) |
| Parliamentary enclosure (Q15) | Increased investment in infrastructure (H54) |
| Parliamentary enclosure (Q15) | Enhanced innovation (O36) |