Information Frictions and Skill Signaling in the Youth Labor Market

Working Paper: NBER ID: w29579

Authors: Sara B. Heller; Judd B. Kessler

Abstract: This paper demonstrates that information frictions limit the labor market trajectories of young people in the U.S. We provide credible skill signals—recommendation letters based on supervisor feedback—to a random subset of 43,409 participants in New York City’s summer jobs program. Letters increase employment the following year by 3 percentage points (4.5 percent). Earnings effects grow over 4 years to a cumulative $1,349 (4.9 percent). We find no evidence of increased job search or confidence; instead, the signals help employers better identify successful matches with high-productivity workers. But the additional work hampers on-time high school graduation, especially among low-achieving students.

Keywords: Information Frictions; Skill Signaling; Youth Labor Market; Recommendation Letters

JEL Codes: C93; I21; J2; J48


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
Recommendation letters (Y30)Employment (J68)
Recommendation letters (Y30)Earnings (J31)
Recommendation letters (Y30)Employer perceptions (J63)
Recommendation letters (Y30)Job search confidence (J68)
Recommendation letters (Y30)On-time high school graduation rates (I21)

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