Working Paper: NBER ID: w29494
Authors: Yanyou Chen; James W. Roberts; Christopher D. Timmins; Ashley Vissing
Abstract: We analyze mortgage lenders’ behavior with respect to shale gas risk during the period of the U.S. shale gas boom, which coincided with fluctuations in the U.S. housing market and increased scrutiny in the lending industry. Shale gas operations have the potential to place affected houses into technical default such that government sponsored enterprises like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are unable to maintain them in their portfolios. We find that lenders changed from being willing to pay $814 on average to avoid one unit of shale risk before the financial distress of 2008 and subsequent increased scrutiny, to $3,137, or 1.6% of profit earned on an average mortgage, afterwards. Our approach provides an alternative to the traditional property value hedonic measurement of the disamenities associated with shale gas development by looking at the decisions of mortgage professionals.
Keywords: shale gas; mortgage lending; risk assessment; financial crisis
JEL Codes: G21; Q35; Q51; Q53
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| shale gas development (L71) | mortgage lending practices (G21) |
| proximity to shale development (L71) | lenders' risk assessment (G21) |
| lenders' willingness to bear income risk (G21) | lenders' willingness to accept shale risk (G21) |
| increased shale gas activity (L71) | changes in mortgage lending practices (G21) |
| technical defaults due to proximity to shale operations (L71) | lenders internalizing risks (G21) |
| lenders' risk preferences (G21) | mortgage lending practices (G21) |