Dynamic Games in Empirical Industrial Organization

Working Paper: NBER ID: w29291

Authors: Victor Aguirregabiria; Allan Collard-Wexler; Stephen P. Ryan

Abstract: This survey is organized around three main topics: models, econometrics, and empirical applications. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework, introduces the concept of Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium, discusses existence and multiplicity, and describes the representation of this equilibrium in terms of conditional choice probabilities. We also discuss extensions of the basic framework, including models in continuous time, the concepts of oblivious equilibrium and experience-based equilibrium, and dynamic games where firms have non-equilibrium beliefs. In section 3, we first provide an overview of the types of data used in this literature, before turning to a discussion of identification issues and results, and estimation methods. We review different methods to deal with multiple equilibria and large state spaces. We also describe recent developments for estimating games in continuous time and incorporating serially correlated unobservables, and discuss the use of machine learning methods to solving and estimating dynamic games. Section 4 discusses empirical applications of dynamic games in IO. We start describing the first empirical applications in this literature during the early 2000s. Then, we review recent applications dealing with innovation, antitrust and mergers, dynamic pricing, regulation, product repositioning, advertising, uncertainty and investment, airline network competition, dynamic matching, and natural resources. We conclude with our view of the progress made in this literature and the remaining challenges.

Keywords: dynamic games; industrial organization; Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium; empirical applications; competition dynamics

JEL Codes: C01; L0


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
Market Structure (D49)Equilibrium Outcomes (D51)
Firm Decisions (D21)Market Structure (D49)
Equilibrium Outcomes (D51)Producer Profits (D33)
Equilibrium Outcomes (D51)Consumer Welfare (D69)
Firm Decisions (D21)Equilibrium Outcomes (D51)
Dynamics in Modeling (C69)Understanding of Competition Impacts (L13)
Dynamics in Modeling (C69)Evaluation of Public Policies (H43)

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