Structural Empirical Analysis of Contracting in Vertical Markets

Working Paper: NBER ID: w29282

Authors: Robin S. Lee; Michael D. Whinston; Ali Yurukoglu

Abstract: This chapter presents an overview of advances in the structural analysis of contracting in vertical markets over the past fifteen years. We provide a discussion of theoretical models of contracting and bargaining that form the basis of recent empirical work, and then present common approaches used by researchers to take these models to the data. We also briefly survey the structural empirical literature on topics in vertical markets (including horizontal and vertical mergers, price discrimination, and nonlinear and exclusionary contracts), and conclude with a discussion of potential topics for future research.

Keywords: vertical markets; contracting; bargaining; empirical analysis; industrial organization

JEL Codes: L1; L13


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
vertical contracting (L14)firm interactions (L14)
contract terms (K12)firm behavior (D21)
vertical structures (L22)predictive accuracy (C52)
contracting externalities (D62)market dynamics (D49)
Nash bargaining solution (C79)contract outcomes (L14)

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