Working Paper: NBER ID: w29175
Authors: John Asker; Volker Nocke
Abstract: This survey examines recent developments in economic research relating to antitrust, paying specific attention to research in the areas of collusion and merger enforcement. Research relating to both collusion and mergers has made significant advances in the last twenty years. With respect to collusion, this includes important theoretical and empirical work on the sustainability, structure, and impact of collusive schemes. With respect to mergers, this includes important work on the impact of enforcement institutions, both theoretical and empirical work on unilateral effects, and theoretical work on the selection of which mergers get proposed to antitrust agencies and optimal policy in the face of that selection. A feature of recent research is the increasing complementarity between empirical work (ranging from observational studies to model-based measurement) and theoretical work in advancing our understanding of collusive and merger-related phenomena.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: K21; L4
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| collusion (D74) | market inefficiencies (G14) |
| market inefficiencies (G14) | consumer surplus (D46) |
| market inefficiencies (G14) | societal welfare (I38) |
| collusion (D74) | market performance (G14) |
| leniency programs (K40) | cartel behavior (L12) |
| leniency programs (K40) | detection rates (C52) |
| collusion (D74) | price elevation (E30) |
| collusion among construction firms (L74) | national investment levels (F21) |