Understanding Investment Incentives Under Parallel Tax Systems: An Application to the Alternative Minimum Tax

Working Paper: NBER ID: w2912

Authors: Andrew B. Lyon

Abstract: The first section of this paper introduces the topic. The next section shows that many parallel tax systems share common features and constructs a general model of the cost of capital based on the Hall-Jorgenson (1967) cost of capital formula. Section 3 presents conditions under which a parallel tax system maintains investment neutrality. In general, the neutrality conditions are sensitive to the assumed arbitrage conditions and source of finance. Section 4 presents findings on the effect of the corporate ANT on investment incentives. It is shown that these investment incentives are sensitive to the length of time the firm is subject to the ANT, the timing of the Mt spell relative to the date the investment is acquired, and the source of financing. Investment incentives for firms experiencing temporary spells on the ANT can be very different from those for firms permanently subject to the ANT. The final section briefly summarizes the paper

Keywords: Investment incentives; Parallel tax systems; Alternative minimum tax; Cost of capital

JEL Codes: H25; H32; D92


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
tax rates (H29)investment incentives (O31)
depreciation schedules (D25)investment incentives (O31)
investment timing (G11)investment incentives (O31)
multiple tax systems (H29)different investment incentives (G31)
AMT (Y20)required pretax return (G12)
time under AMT (Y20)investment decisions (G11)
initial tax rate (H25)required pretax return (G12)
tax credits (H23)investment decisions (G11)
depreciation allowances (D25)investment decisions (G11)
cost of capital (G31)investment incentives (O31)

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