Working Paper: NBER ID: w29043
Authors: Marcelo A. Fernandez; Kirill Rudov; Leeat Yariv
Abstract: We study the impacts of incomplete information on centralized one-to-one matching markets. We focus on the commonly used Deferred Acceptance mechanism (Gale and Shapley, 1962). We show that many complete-information results are fragile to a small infusion of uncertainty about others' preferences.
Keywords: centralized matching; incomplete information; deferred acceptance mechanism
JEL Codes: C78; D47; D82
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Incomplete information about others' preferences (D80) | instability in matchings (C78) |
| Presence of uncertainty (D80) | stability of outcomes (C62) |
| Degree of uncertainty (D81) | number of affected participants in equilibrium outcomes (C62) |
| Information completeness (L15) | validity of technical assumptions (C52) |