Working Paper: NBER ID: w28857
Authors: Judson Boomhower
Abstract: The electoral salience of some issues may diminish when one politician has authority over many policy areas. This study measures the role of environmental regulation in concurrent elections for governors and specialized energy regulators in two U.S. states. I first show that while both offices can influence environmental and energy policies, quantitative analysis of campaign news coverage reveals clear differences in the importance of these issues in the two races. Next, I use geologic variation in earthquakes caused by oil and gas production to measure the electoral consequences of a costly environmental externality. There are measurable effects only in the energy regulator race. These results are consistent with theories of issue bundling. Finally, the unbundling effects that I measure appear to be themselves limited by voter attentiveness and partisanship.
Keywords: Environmental Externalities; Electoral Consequences; Fracking; Earthquakes
JEL Codes: D72; H11; Q35; Q58
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| induced seismicity (L71) | vote share for the Republican candidate for the Oklahoma Corporation Commission (OCC) (K16) |
| induced seismicity (L71) | undervote for the energy regulator (L94) |
| induced seismicity (L71) | voting behavior in the energy regulator race (K16) |
| induced seismicity (L71) | voting behavior in the gubernatorial race (K16) |
| environmental regulation (Q58) | electoral outcomes (K16) |