Working Paper: NBER ID: w28823
Authors: Jeremy D. West; Robert W. Fairlie; Bryan E. Pratt; Liam Rose
Abstract: This study evaluates two interventions for residential water conservation. Comparing households across an enforcement algorithm’s cutoff using a regression discontinuity design, we find that automated irrigation violation warnings cause substantial water conservation but also shift some consumption from regulated to unregulated hours within the week. In contrast, we show using data from a randomized experiment with the same customers that normative Home Water Reports reduce water use by a much smaller amount, but that this social pressure is effective during all hours both before and after automating irrigation policy enforcement. Our findings highlight the merits of implementing multidimensional conservation programs.
Keywords: water conservation; automated enforcement; social pressure; irrigation regulations
JEL Codes: D04; L98; Q25; R22
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| combination of automated enforcement and social pressure interventions (C92) | enhance conservation efforts (Q57) |
| HWRs (I00) | reduce water use (Q25) |
| HWRs (I00) | consistent effects before and after automated enforcement (R48) |
| automated irrigation violation warnings (Q25) | substantial reduction in residential water consumption (Q25) |
| automated irrigation violation warnings (Q25) | increase in share of households warned about violations (D18) |
| automated enforcement (R48) | gross conservation of water during prohibited irrigation periods (Q25) |
| automated enforcement (R48) | leakage effect during allowed irrigation times (Q25) |