Working Paper: NBER ID: w28793
Authors: Simeon Djankov; Edward L. Glaeser; Valeria Perotti; Andrei Shleifer
Abstract: How do the different elements in the standard bundle of property rights, including those of possession and transfer, influence the shape of cities? This paper incorporates insecure property rights into a standard model of urban land prices and density, and makes predictions about investment in land and property, informality, and the efficiency of land use. Our empirical analysis links data on institutions for land titling and transfer with multiple urban outcomes, in 190 countries. The evidence is generally consistent with the model’s predictions, and more broadly with the Demsetz’s (1967) approach to property rights institutions. Indeed, we document world-wide improvements in the quality of institutions facilitating property transfer over time.
Keywords: Property Rights; Urban Form; Land Prices; Density; Investment
JEL Codes: K11; P14; R30
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| right of possession (P14) | improved housing stock (R21) |
| right of possession (P14) | reduced urban density (R11) |
| right of transfer (P14) | facilitating mobility (J62) |
| right of transfer (P14) | reduced traffic congestion (R48) |
| weak possession rights (P14) | higher urban density (R23) |
| weak possession rights (P14) | poorer housing quality (R28) |
| weak transfer rights (P14) | increased traffic congestion (L91) |
| number of transfer procedures (F16) | prevalence of housing loans (G51) |