Working Paper: NBER ID: w28774
Authors: Stephen H. Haber; Naomi R. Lamoreaux
Abstract: This essay is the introduction to a book of the same title, forthcoming in summer of 2021 from Oxford University Press. The purpose is to document the ways in which patent systems are products of battles over the economic surplus from innovation. The features of these systems take shape as interests at different points in the production chain seek advantage in any way they can, and consequently, they are riven with imperfections. The interesting historical question is why US-style patent systems with all their imperfections have come to dominate other methods of encouraging inventive activity. The essays in the book suggest that the creation of a tradable but temporary property right facilitates the transfer of technological knowledge and thus fosters a highly productive decentralized ecology of inventors and firms.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: N4; N41; N42; N43; N44; O3; O34
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| US-style patent systems (O34) | increased innovation (O35) |
| stronger patent laws (K11) | improved negotiating power for innovators (O36) |
| firms developing innovations (O31) | lobby for stronger patent laws (L49) |
| firms further up the production chain (L23) | lobby for weaker patent laws (L49) |
| strength of patent protection (O34) | distribution of economic benefits among stakeholders (D33) |
| interests of various stakeholders (G38) | influence patent system (O34) |
| complaints about patent systems (O34) | reflect ongoing tensions in distribution of surplus (D39) |