Working Paper: NBER ID: w28728
Authors: Martin Ravallion
Abstract: Governments often prohibit resale of the benefits-in-kind provided by antipoverty programs. Yet the personal gains from those benefits are likely to vary and to be known privately, so there can be gains to poor people from trading their assignments. We know very little about those gains. To help address this knowledge gap, the paper models a competitive market for assignments, and simulates the market using an unusual survey of workers on a rural public-works scheme in a poor state of India. The results indicate large gains from tradeable assignments after first randomizing. The gains exceed those from poverty targeting without trade and are not lower for poorer households or female workers. Fully realizing the gains from trade in practice may require complementary policies to help people access the market and to support its administration and regulation.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: H30; I38; O15
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| allowing tradeable assignments (F16) | increases the aggregate gains from the public works scheme (H54) |
| tradeable assignments (F16) | significant enhancement in welfare for participants (I38) |
| gains from tradeable assignments (F16) | impacts on the aggregate poverty gap (I32) |
| tradeable assignments (F16) | equitable distribution of benefits (D63) |
| realization of gains from tradeable assignments (F16) | requires complementary policies (F68) |