Working Paper: NBER ID: w28550
Authors: Mark Borgschulte; Marius Guenzel; Canyao Liu; Ulrike Malmendier
Abstract: We estimate the long-term effects of experiencing high levels of job demands on the mortality and aging of CEOs. The estimation exploits variation in takeover protection and industry crises. First, using hand-collected data on the dates of birth and death for 1,605 CEOs of large, publicly-listed U.S. firms, we estimate the resulting changes in mortality. The hazard estimates indicate that CEOs’ lifespan increases by two years when insulated from market discipline via anti-takeover laws, and decreases by 1.5 years in response to an industry-wide downturn. Second, we apply neural-network based machine-learning techniques to assess visible signs of aging in pictures of CEOs. We estimate that exposure to a distress shock during the Great Recession increases CEOs’ apparent age by one year over the next decade. Our findings imply significant health costs of managerial stress, also relative to known health risks.
Keywords: CEO; stress; mortality; aging; anti-takeover laws; industry crises
JEL Codes: G01; G3; I10; J01
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Industry distress shocks (L16) | CEO mortality risk (M12) |
| Distress shocks during the Great Recession (F65) | Visible signs of aging (J14) |
| Anti-takeover laws (G34) | Life expectancy of incumbent CEOs (J26) |