Working Paper: NBER ID: w28492
Authors: Amrita Ahuja; Susan Athey; Arthur Baker; Eric Budish; Juan Camilo Castillo; Rachel Glennerster; Scott Duke Kominers; Michael Kremer; Jean Nahrae Lee; Canice Prendergast; Christopher M. Snyder; Alex Tabarrok; Brandon Joel Tan; Witold Wicek
Abstract: Vaccinating the world’s population quickly in a pandemic has enormous health and economic benefits. We analyze the problem faced by governments in determining the scale and structure of procurement for vaccines. We analyze alternative approaches to procurement. We find that if the goal is to accelerate the vaccine delivery timetable, buyers should directly fund manufacturing capacity and shoulder most of the risk of failure, while maintaining some direct incentives for speed. We analyzed the optimal portfolio of vaccine investments for countries with different characteristics as well as the implications for international cooperation. Our analysis, considered in light of the experience of 2020, suggests lessons for future pandemics.
Keywords: vaccine procurement; pandemic response; government intervention; manufacturing capacity; public health
JEL Codes: D02; H12; I11; I18; O19; O31
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Government funding strategies (H59) | Speed of vaccine availability (C69) |
| Country's economic status (O57) | Vaccine procurement strategies (H57) |
| Investment in capacity (E22) | Health outcomes (I14) |
| Portfolio diversity (G11) | Successful vaccine outcomes (I10) |
| Investment strategies (G11) | Pandemic response effectiveness (H12) |