Working Paper: NBER ID: w28463
Authors: Marina Gertsberg; Johanna Mollerstrom; Michaela Pagel
Abstract: We study shareholder support for corporate board nominees before and after the 2018 California gender quota. Pre-quota, new female nominees received greater support than new male nominees, consistent with women being held to a higher standard. Post-quota, as the number of women increased, support for new (mandated) female nominees decreased to the same level of, but not lower than, the support that new male nominees enjoy. Still, share prices reacted negatively to the quota. We show that this reaction was concentrated in firms that did not turn over their least-supported male directors when adding women to comply with the quota.
Keywords: gender quotas; corporate governance; shareholder support
JEL Codes: G3; J16; J7
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| California gender quota (J79) | shareholder support for female nominees (G34) |
| California gender quota (J79) | stock prices (G12) |
| failure to turnover unpopular male directors (G34) | negative stock market response (G41) |
| California gender quota (J79) | retention of low-supported male directors (G34) |
| retention of low-supported male directors (G34) | negative stock market response (G41) |
| California gender quota (J79) | changes in support for female nominees (J16) |
| prior support for female nominees (J16) | support for new mandated female nominees (J16) |