Working Paper: NBER ID: w28458
Authors: Christopher Blattman; Gustavo Duncan; Benjamin Lessing; Santiago Tobón
Abstract: Criminal groups govern millions worldwide. Even in strong states, gangs resolve disputes and provide security. Why do these duopolies of coercion emerge? In many cases, gangs fill vacuums of official order. If so, increasing state presence should crowd out criminal governance. In this paper, however, we show that state and gang rule are sometimes complements. In particular, gangs can deter state predation by keeping neighborhoods orderly and loyal. If true, increasing state presence could increase gang rule. We investigate in Medellín, Colombia. Criminal leaders told us they rule mainly to protect drug rents. We test gang responses to state presence using a geographic discontinuity. Internal border changes in 1987 assigned some blocks to be exogenously closer to state security for three decades. Gangs responded to closer state presence by increasing governance services, but primarily in neighborhoods with the greatest potential drug rents. This suggests new strategies for countering criminal governance.
Keywords: Criminal Governance; Gang Rule; State Presence; Medellín; Colombia
JEL Codes: C93; E26; H11; K42; O17
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| State presence (H79) | Gang governance (D73) |
| Distance to state security (F52) | Gang governance (D73) |
| State presence (H79) | Responsiveness of governance (H11) |
| Gang governance (D73) | State governance (H70) |