Working Paper: NBER ID: w28335
Authors: Daniel P. Gross; Bhaven N. Sampat
Abstract: Since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, policymakers, researchers, and journalists have made comparisons to World War II. In 1940, a group of top U.S. science administrators organized a major coordinated research effort to support the Allied war effort, including significant investments in medical research which yielded innovations like mass-produced penicillin, antimalarials, and a flu vaccine. We draw on this episode to discuss the economics of crisis innovation. Since the objectives of crisis R&D are different than ordinary R&D (prioritizing speed, coordination, redundancy, and more), we argue that appropriate R&D policy in a crisis requires going beyond the standard Nelson-Arrow framework for research policy.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: H12; H56; N42; N72; O31; O32; O38
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| OSRD's approach during World War II (H56) | significant technological advancements (O33) |
| OSRD's prioritization of results and applied research (I23) | rapid development and deployment of essential technologies (O39) |
| OSRD's funding strategies favoring quick results (I23) | environment conducive to innovation (O36) |
| need for speed in crisis situations (H12) | overlapping parallel research efforts (O36) |
| overlapping parallel research efforts (O36) | effective crisis resolution (H12) |
| urgency of crises (H12) | significant public funding for R&D (O38) |
| characteristics of crisis innovation (O35) | rethinking of standard innovation frameworks (O36) |