Working Paper: NBER ID: w28330
Authors: Caitlin Carroll; David M. Cutler; Anupam Jena
Abstract: The general deterrence effects of malpractice laws on physician behavior have been extensively studied but may lack salience for physicians. We study the role of specific deterrence in malpractice liability by examining how physicians respond to being accused of malpractice. With the universe of data on patient care and malpractice complaints for Florida emergency physicians, we find that physicians oversee 9% fewer discharges after allegations and treat each discharge 5% more expensively. Effects are similar for paid claims and dropped accusations. Increases in treatment are generalized, i.e., not limited to conditions similar to what the physician is reported for.
Keywords: malpractice; defensive medicine; physician behavior; emergency departments
JEL Codes: I11; J44; K41
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| malpractice allegations (K41) | physician behavior (I11) |
| malpractice allegations (K41) | labor supply (J20) |
| malpractice allegations (K41) | treatment intensity (C32) |
| malpractice allegations (K41) | costs per discharge (J32) |