Working Paper: NBER ID: w2805
Authors: Richard B. Freeman; Morris M. Kleiner
Abstract: The direct role of employers in union organizing has long been a neglected part of the union organizing literature. In this study we examine the determinants and consequences of employer behavior when faced with an organizing drive. Our principal substantive findings are: - that there is a substitution between high wages/benefits/good work conditions/supervisory practices and "tough" management opposition to unionism. - that a high innate propensity for a union victory deters management opposition, while some indicators of a low propensity also reduce opposition. - that "positive industrial relations" raise the chances the firm will defeat the union in an election, as does bringing in consultants and having supervisors campaign intensely against the union. - that the careers of managers whose wages/supervisory practices/ benefits lead to union organizing drives, much less to union victories, suffer as a result. In general we interpret our results as consistent with the notion that firms behave in a profit maximizing manner in opposing an organizing drive and with the basic proposition that management opposition, reflected in diverse forms of behavior, is a key component in the on-going decline in private sector unionism in the United States.
Keywords: union organizing; management opposition; industrial relations
JEL Codes: J51; J53
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| management opposition (L29) | union outcomes (J51) |
| innate probability of a union victory (D74) | management opposition (L29) |
| high wages/benefits (J32) | management opposition (L29) |
| positive industrial relations (J53) | chances of defeating a union (J58) |
| management strategies (hiring consultants) (M55) | undermining union efforts (J51) |
| management strategies (supervisor campaigning) (M54) | undermining union efforts (J51) |