Working Paper: NBER ID: w27981
Authors: Renee Bowen; Ilwoo Hwang; Stefan Krasa
Abstract: We study bargaining between a fixed agenda-setter and responder over successive issues. If the responder rejects the setter’s proposal, the setter can attempt to assert her will to implement her ideal and will succeed with a probability that depends on her “personal power”. Players learn about the setter’s power as gridlock persists. Gridlock occurs when the setter’s perceived power is either too high or too low, and the players reach compromise when the setter has moderate personal power. The presence of “difficult” issues can induce more compromise as the players have incentives to avoid testing the setter’s power.
Keywords: bargaining; personal power; political decision-making; gridlock; compromise
JEL Codes: C78; D72; D74; D83
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| perceived personal power (P26) | bargaining dynamics (C79) |
| moderate perceived personal power (I31) | compromise (D74) |
| extreme perceived personal power (P26) | gridlock (L91) |
| contentiousness of issues (D72) | dynamics of perceived power (C69) |
| difficult issues (O17) | gridlock (L91) |
| learning from past interactions (C92) | evolution of perceived power (O33) |