Working Paper: NBER ID: w27949
Authors: Georgy Egorov; Konstantin Sonin
Abstract: We survey recent theoretical and empirical literature on political economics of non-democracies. Dictators face many challenges to their rule: internal, such as palace coups or breakdown of their support coalition, or external, such as mass protests or revolutions. We analyze strategic decisions made by dictators — hiring political loyalists to positions that require competence, restricting media freedom at the cost of sacrificing bureaucratic efficiency, running a propaganda campaign, organizing electoral fraud, purging associates and opponents, and repressing citizens — as driven by the desire to maximize the regime's chances of staying in power. We argue that the key to understanding the functioning and ultimately the fate of a nondemocratic regime is the information flows within the regime, and the institutions that govern these information flows.
Keywords: nondemocracy; information control; dictatorship; political economy
JEL Codes: C73; D72; D74; D82; D83; P16
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| dictators who manipulate information through censorship and propaganda (D73) | enhance their chances of staying in power (D72) |
| controlling information alters citizens' perceptions of the regime's strength (D83) | affects their likelihood of participating in protests or revolutions (D72) |
| the trade-off between hiring competent subordinates and maintaining loyalty (M54) | leads to a cycle where incompetent but loyal officials can hinder effective governance (D73) |
| electoral fraud (K16) | serves as a tool for dictators to project strength and manage elite coalitions (D73) |