Working Paper: NBER ID: w27875
Authors: C Yiwei Zhang; Jeffrey Hemmeter; Judd B Kessler; Robert D Metcalfe; Robert Weathers
Abstract: We study a large-scale (n=50,000) natural field experiment implemented by the U.S. Social Security Administration that was aimed at increasing the timely and accurate self-reporting of wages by Supplemental Security Income (SSI) recipients. Sending a letter reminding SSI recipients of their wage reporting responsibilities significantly increased both the likelihood of reporting any earnings and the total amount of earnings reported, though this effect decays slightly over time. However, the specific letter content—providing social information or highlighting the salience of penalties—had no systematic effect. We develop a conservative estimate that the letters generated roughly $5.91 in savings on average per dollar spent for the U.S. government.
Keywords: Behavioral Economics; Nudges; Wage Reporting; Social Security Income; Field Experiment
JEL Codes: D04; H2
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Sending a reminder letter to SSI recipients (H55) | Increased likelihood of reporting earnings (G14) |
| Sending a reminder letter to SSI recipients (H55) | Increased reported earnings (E01) |
| Specific behavioral framing of the letter (Y20) | Reporting behavior (C92) |