Working Paper: NBER ID: w27822
Authors: Marco Battaglini; Valerio Leone Sciabolazza; Eleonora Patacchini
Abstract: We study the extent to which personal connections among legislators influence abstentions in the U.S. Congress. Our analysis is conducted by observing representatives' abstention for the universe of roll call votes held on bills in the 109th-113th Congresses. Our results show that a legislator's propensity to abstain increases when the majority of his or her alumni connections abstains, even after controlling for other well-known predictors of abstention choices and a vast set of fixed effects. We further reveal that a legislator is more prone to abstain than to take sides when the demands from personal connections conflict with those of the legislator's party.
Keywords: abstention; social networks; Congress
JEL Codes: D72; D74; D91
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Alumni connections abstaining (Y80) | Legislator's propensity to abstain (D72) |
| Conflicting demands from personal connections and party colleagues (D73) | Legislator's propensity to abstain (D72) |
| Majority of party colleagues vote against a bill sponsored by an alumni connection (D72) | Legislator's propensity to abstain (D72) |