Social Distancing, Vaccination, and the Paradoxical Optimality of an Endemic Equilibrium

Working Paper: NBER ID: w27742

Authors: Andrew B. Abel; Stavros Panageas

Abstract: We analyze the impact of public health policy on the spread of a disease using a version of the SIR model that includes vital statistics, waning immunity, and vaccination. This model is rich enough to accommodate endemic steady states and disease-free steady states. We choose social distancing and vaccines to maximize an objective function that penalizes lost output resulting from social distancing, deaths resulting from the disease, and the cost of vaccination. Surprisingly, even though a disease-free equilibrium is attainable, optimal policy leads to an endemic steady state, though with a small number of deaths and negligible loss of output.

Keywords: No keywords provided

JEL Codes: C61; E61; I18


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
social distancing and vaccination strategies (I14)endemic steady state (D50)
optimal public health policy (H51)endemic steady state (D50)
social distancing (I14)lost output (C67)
deaths caused by the disease (I12)endemic steady state (D50)
vaccination costs (J32)endemic steady state (D50)

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