Intermediation and Competition in Search Markets: An Empirical Case Study

Working Paper: NBER ID: w27700

Authors: Tobias Salz

Abstract: Intermediaries in decentralized markets can affect buyer welfare both directly, by reducing expenses for buyers with high search cost and indirectly, through a search-externality that affects the prices paid by buyers that do not use intermediaries. I investigate the magnitude of these effects in New York City’s trade-waste market, where buyers can either search by themselves or through a waste broker. Combining elements from the empirical search and procurement-auction literatures, I construct and estimate a model for a decentralized market. Results from the model show that intermediaries improve welfare and benefit buyers in both the broker and the search markets.

Keywords: intermediation; competition; search markets; buyer welfare; trade waste market

JEL Codes: D43; D44; L0; L13; L81; L97


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
intermediaries (L14)buyer welfare (D69)
search costs (D23)buyer expenses (R21)
intermediaries (L14)search externality (D62)
intermediaries (L14)average expenses for buyers (D12)

Back to index