Working Paper: NBER ID: w27631
Authors: Georgy Egorov; Konstantin Sonin
Abstract: We analyze persuasion in a model in which each receiver can buy a direct access to the sender's signal or rely on her network connections to get it. For the sender, a higher bias increases the impact per direct receiver, yet diminishes the willingness of agents to receive information. Contrary to naive intuition, the optimal propaganda might target peripheral, rather than centrally-located agents, and is at its maximum levels when the probability that information flows between agents is close to zero or one, but not in-between. The impact of network density depends on this probability as well.
Keywords: Propaganda; Networks; Bayesian Persuasion
JEL Codes: D85; L82; P16
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| sender's bias (D91) | effectiveness of propaganda (C92) |
| higher bias (C46) | impact on direct receivers (F69) |
| higher bias (C46) | willingness of agents to subscribe (L85) |
| probability of information flow (D89) | sender's optimal propaganda strategy (D72) |
| higher slant (Y20) | greater impact on direct receivers (F69) |
| higher slant (Y20) | lower willingness of agents to subscribe (L85) |
| network density (D85) | sender's reporting of information (L96) |
| targeting peripheral agents (L65) | better outcomes for sender (F24) |