Working Paper: NBER ID: w27628
Authors: Hanming Fang; Chang Liu; Lian Zhou
Abstract: We examine window dressing phenomenon in the public sector by studying the strategic responses of Chinese local officials to the compulsory education promotion program launched by the central government in the 1990s. According to this program, the Chinese counties should receive inspections on whether the compulsory educational targets were achieved on pre-scheduled time by provincial governments; and failing to pass the inspection would have severe negative career consequences for the county leaders. We find that county-level educational expenditures saw a sustained increase before the inspection, but a sharp drop immediately after the inspection. Local officials who were more likely to be inspected within their tenures window-dressed more aggressively. As a result, middle school enrollment rates declined significantly after the inspection, and rural girls bore the blunt of the decline in school enrollment.
Keywords: Window Dressing; Public Sector; Compulsory Education; China; Political Incentives
JEL Codes: D73; H11; H41; P26
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| County-level educational expenditures (H75) | Middle school enrollment rates (I21) |
| Inspection timing (C41) | Local leaders' mobilization of resources (H84) |
| Compulsory education promotion program inspections (I21) | County-level educational expenditures (H75) |
| Compulsory education promotion program inspections (I21) | Middle school enrollment rates (I21) |
| Inspection timing (C41) | County-level educational expenditures (H75) |