How Much to Save? Decision Costs and Retirement Plan Participation

Working Paper: NBER ID: w27575

Authors: Jacob Goldin; Tatiana Homonoff; Richard W. Patterson; William L. Skimmyhorn

Abstract: Deciding how much to save for retirement can be complicated. Drawing on a field experiment conducted with the Department of Defense, we study whether such complexity depresses participation in an employer-sponsored retirement saving plan. We find that simplifying one dimension of the enrollment decision, by highlighting a potential rate at which non-participants might contribute, increases participation in the plan. Similar communications that did not include a highlighted rate yield smaller effects. The results highlight how reducing complexity on the intensive margin of a decision (how much to contribute) can affect extensive margin behavior (whether to contribute at all) in a setting of policy interest.

Keywords: Retirement Savings; Decision Costs; Participation; Field Experiment

JEL Codes: D14; G41


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
highlighting a specific contribution rate (E25)increases participation in the retirement savings plan (D14)
specific rate treatment (C22)concentration of contributions at the highlighted rate (D30)
intervention did not merely speed up enrollment (I24)encouraged new participants who would otherwise not have enrolled (I24)

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