Working Paper: NBER ID: w27569
Authors: Aidan Coville; Sebastian Galiani; Paul Gertler; Susumu Yoshida
Abstract: We estimate the impacts of two interventions implemented as field experiments in informal settlements by Nairobi’s water and sanitation utility to improve revenue collection efficiency and last mile connection loan repayment: (i) face-to-face engagement between utility staff and customers to encourage payment and (ii) contract enforcement for service disconnection due to nonpayment in the form of transparent and credible disconnection notices. While we find no effect of the engagement, we find large effects of enforcement on payment. We also find no effect on access to water, perceptions of utility fairness or quality of service delivery, on the relationships between tenants and property owners, or on tenant mental well-being nine months after the intervention. To counterbalance the increase in payments, property owners increased rental income by renting out additional space. Taken together these results suggest that transparent contract enforcement was effective at improving revenue collection efficiency without incurring large social or political costs.
Keywords: water services; sanitation; revenue collection; urban settlements; field experiments
JEL Codes: C93; D04; O18
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| payment behavior (E42) | likelihood of property owners making payments (R21) |
| payment behavior (E42) | total amount paid (J33) |
| face-to-face engagement intervention (C90) | payment behavior (E42) |
| enforcement intervention (K40) | likelihood of property owners making payments (R21) |
| enforcement intervention (K40) | total amount paid (J33) |
| enforcement intervention (K40) | spillover effects on control property owners (H13) |