Working Paper: NBER ID: w27523
Authors: Anna Aizer; Shari Eli; Adriana Lleras-Muney
Abstract: All redistributive and social insurance programs trade off the potential benefits of transfers with the disincentives these programs generate. We investigate this trade-off using newly collected lifetime data for 16,000 women who applied to the Mothers’ Pension Program, the first cash transfer program in the US. In the short-run cash transfers reduced geographic mobility and delayed marriage of recipients but did not affect who they married or where they moved to. In the long run transfers had no effect on work, marriage or fertility behaviors. They also did not improve the economic conditions of recipients or their longevity.
Keywords: cash transfers; welfare programs; mothers pension program; behavioral responses; poverty alleviation
JEL Codes: I12; I14; I18; I32; I38; J16; N32
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| age norms and stigma (J14) | behaviors (C92) |
| cash transfers (F24) | reduced geographic mobility (J62) |
| cash transfers (F24) | delayed marriage (J12) |
| cash transfers (F24) | likelihood of remarriage (J12) |
| cash transfers (F24) | quality of new partners (L15) |
| cash transfers (F24) | long-term work behaviors (J29) |
| cash transfers (F24) | long-term marriage behaviors (J12) |
| cash transfers (F24) | long-term fertility behaviors (J13) |
| cash transfers (F24) | economic conditions of recipients (F35) |
| cash transfers (F24) | longevity of recipients (I14) |
| cash transfers (F24) | behavioral responses (D91) |