Can Technology Solve the Principal-Agent Problem? Evidence from China's War on Air Pollution

Working Paper: NBER ID: w27502

Authors: Michael Greenstone; Guojun He; Ruixue Jia; Tong Liu

Abstract: We examine the introduction of automatic air pollution monitoring, which is a central feature of China’s “war on pollution.” Exploiting 654 regression discontinuity designs based on city-level variation in the day that monitoring was automated, we find that reported PM₁₀ concentrations increased by 35% immediately post–automation and were sustained. City-level variation in underreporting is negatively correlated with income per capita and positively correlated with true pre-automation PM₁₀ concentrations. Further, automation’s introduction increased online searches for face masks and air filters, suggesting that the biased and imperfect pre-automation information imposed welfare costs by leading to suboptimal purchases of protective goods.

Keywords: Air Pollution; Monitoring; Principal-Agent Problem; China

JEL Codes: Q53; Q55


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
Increase in reported PM10 concentrations (Q53)Increased online searches for face masks and air filters (R23)
Introduction of automatic monitoring (C45)Increase in reported PM10 concentrations (Q53)
Introduction of automatic monitoring (C45)Decrease in local government manipulation of pollution data (H70)

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