Working Paper: NBER ID: w27498
Authors: Massimo Pulejo; Pablo Querubín
Abstract: The outbreak of COVID-19 has called for swift action by governments, often involving the adoption of restrictive measures such as lockdowns. In this context, leaders have faced a trade-off between imposing stringent measures to limit the contagion, and minimizing the costs on their national economy, which could impact their electoral prospects. Leveraging on both the timing of elections and the constitutional term limits faced by leaders, we document how incumbents who can run for re-election implement less stringent restrictions when the election is closer in time. The effect is driven by measures more likely to have a negative economic impact. This shows how electoral concerns help explain the observed differences in the response to COVID-19 across different countries.
Keywords: COVID-19; electoral concerns; government response; stringency measures
JEL Codes: D72; I18
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| electoral concerns (K16) | government stringency (H10) |
| incumbents' eligibility for reelection (K16) | government stringency (H10) |
| proximity to next election (K16) | government stringency (H10) |
| electoral incentives (D72) | government stringency (H10) |