Interest Rates and the Design of Financial Contracts

Working Paper: NBER ID: w27195

Authors: Michael R. Roberts; Michael Schwert

Abstract: We show that the partial response of loan rates to interest rate changes, referred to in the bank lending literature as “stickiness,” is a feature of perfect capital markets. No-arbitrage models of credit risk are able to replicate empirical interest rate sensitivities. However, the widespread use of interest rate floors in the low-rate environment of the last decade is a result of risk-sharing and incentive considerations arising from market imperfections. Floors reallocate cash flows across states in a way that loan spreads cannot. They insure lenders against losses if rates fall, while mitigating borrower moral hazard if rates rise.

Keywords: Interest Rates; Financial Contracts; Leveraged Loans; Loan Pricing

JEL Codes: E44; G21


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
Interest Rates (E43)Loan Rates (E43)
Interest Rates (E43)Loan Spreads (G51)
Interest Rate Floors (E43)Loan Contracts (K12)
Interest Rates (E43)Probability of Including a Floor (C29)
Interest Rate Floors (E43)Moral Hazard Problems (D82)

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