Working Paper: NBER ID: w26627
Authors: Moshe A. Barach; John J. Horton
Abstract: We report the results of a field experiment in which treated employers could not observe the compensation history of their job applicants. Treated employers responded by evaluating more applicants, and evaluating those applicants more intensively. They also responded by changing what kind of workers they evaluated: treated employers evaluated workers with 5% lower past average wages and hired workers with 13% lower past average wages. Conditional upon bargaining, workers hired by treated employers struck better wage bargains for themselves.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: J0; J23; J48; J7
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| removal of access to compensation history (J79) | increase in the number of applicants evaluated (C52) |
| removal of access to compensation history (J79) | decrease in past average wages of hired workers (J39) |
| removal of access to compensation history (J79) | better wage bargains for hired workers (J31) |
| removal of access to compensation history (J79) | influence on outcomes of bargaining (C78) |
| removal of access to compensation history (J79) | no significant effect on probability of bargaining occurring (C79) |