Working Paper: NBER ID: w2658
Authors: Robert W. Staiger; Guido Tabellini
Abstract: We argue in this paper that the second-best nature of trade-policy intervention makes it likely that the issue of time consistency viii be an important consideration in determining both the extent and the efficacy of such intervention in most environments. The point is seen most directly by noting that a tariff is both a tax on consumers and a subsidy to producers of the import-competing good. Since first-best intervention typically calls for targeting each distortion with a separate tax/subsidy, the tariff will be a more effective policy tool if its consumption tax aspect can be separated from its production subsidy dimension. Consequently, if production decisions are made prior to consumption decisions, a government with sufficient policy flexibility will be tempted to surprise producers with policies other than those announced in an effort to make this separation. This leads optimal trade policy intervention to be time-inconsistent in a wide range of environments. We explore this idea in general terms and illustrate the results with specific examples.
Keywords: Trade Policy; Time Inconsistency; Tariffs; Government Discretion
JEL Codes: F13; F41
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| government discretion (H61) | timing and nature of trade policy interventions (F13) |
| timing and nature of trade policy interventions (F13) | distorted producer expectations (D84) |
| government discretion (H61) | trade policy effectiveness (F13) |
| production decisions made prior to consumption decisions (D25) | government control over producers' expectations (E64) |
| government control over producers' expectations (E64) | inefficient allocations of resources (D61) |
| government discretion (H61) | optimal trade policy (F13) |