Working Paper: NBER ID: w26469
Authors: Marco Cipriani; Ana Fostel; Daniel Houser
Abstract: We study default and endogenous leverage in the laboratory. To this purpose, we develop a general equilibrium model of collateralized borrowing amenable to laboratory implementation and gather experimental data. In the model, leverage is endogenous: agents choose how much to borrow using a risky asset as collateral, and there are no ad-hoc collateral constraints. When the risky asset is financial, namely, its payoff does not depend on ownership (such as a bonds), collateral requirements are high and there is no default. In contrast, when the risky asset is non-financial, namely, its payoff depends on ownership (such as a firm), collateral requirements are lower and default occurs. The experimental outcomes are in line with the theory's main predictions. The type of collateral, whether financial or not, matters. Default rates and loss from default are higher when the risky asset is non-financial, stemming from laxer collateral requirements. Default rates and collateral requirements are closer to the theoretical predictions as the experiment progresses.
Keywords: collateral; default; double auction; experimental economics; leverage
JEL Codes: A10; C90; D52; D53; G10
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Collateral Type (G32) | Default Rates (E43) |
| Non-Financial Asset (G19) | Lower Collateral Requirements (G21) |
| Lower Collateral Requirements (G21) | Higher Default Rates (G21) |
| Learning Mechanism (D83) | Convergence of Default Rates and Collateral Requirements (G33) |
| Financial Asset (G19) | High Collateral Requirements (G32) |
| NFA Treatment (C22) | Higher Default Rates (G21) |
| FA Treatment (F38) | No Default (Y70) |