Working Paper: NBER ID: w26293
Authors: Christopher Blattman; Horacio Larreguy; Benjamin Marx; Otis R. Reid
Abstract: We estimate the effects of one of the largest anti-vote-buying campaigns ever studied — with half a million voters exposed across 1427 villages—in Uganda’s 2016 elections. Working with civil society organizations, we designed the study to estimate how voters and candidates responded to their campaign in treatment and spillover villages, and how impacts varied with campaign intensity. Despite its heavy footprint, the campaign did not reduce politician offers of gifts in exchange for votes. However, it had sizable effects on people’s votes. Votes swung from well-funded incumbents (who buy most votes) towards their poorly-financed challengers. We argue the swing arose from changes in village social norms plus the tactical response of candidates. While the campaign struggled to instill norms of refusing gifts, it leveled the electoral playing field by convincing some voters to abandon norms of reciprocity—thus accepting gifts from politicians but voting for their preferred candidate.
Keywords: vote buying; Uganda; elections; social norms; political accountability
JEL Codes: C93; D72; O55
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| anti-vote buying campaign (D72) | decrease in vote shares for incumbents (D72) |
| anti-vote buying campaign (D72) | changes in social norms among voters (D72) |
| changes in social norms among voters (D72) | decrease in vote shares for incumbents (D72) |
| anti-vote buying campaign (D72) | increase in vote buying efforts by challenger candidates (D72) |
| anti-vote buying campaign (D72) | weakening of reciprocity norm (Z13) |
| weakening of reciprocity norm (Z13) | voters accept gifts from multiple candidates but vote for preferred candidate (D79) |