Cryptocurrencies, Currency Competition, and the Impossible Trinity

Working Paper: NBER ID: w26214

Authors: Pierpaolo Benigno; Linda M. Schilling; Harald Uhlig

Abstract: We analyze a two-country economy with complete markets, featuring two national currencies as well as a global (crypto)currency. If the global currency is used in both countries, the national nominal interest rates must be equal and the exchange rate between the national currencies is a risk-adjusted martingale. Deviation from interest rate equality implies the risk of approaching the zero lower bound or the abandonment of the national currency. We call this result Crypto-Enforced Monetary Policy Synchronization (CEMPS). If the global currency is backed by interest-bearing assets, additional and tight restrictions on monetary policy arise. Thus, the classic Impossible Trinity becomes even less reconcilable.

Keywords: cryptocurrencies; currency competition; monetary policy; impossible trinity

JEL Codes: D53; E4; F31; G12


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
Adoption of a global cryptocurrency (E42)Synchronized nominal interest rates (E43)
Synchronized nominal interest rates (E43)Maintaining the use of national currencies (F33)
Global currency backed by interest-bearing assets (F33)Additional constraints on monetary policy (E49)
Additional constraints on monetary policy (E49)Reinforced impossibility of independent monetary policy, fixed exchange rate, and free capital flows simultaneously (F33)
Central bank's attempt to adjust interest rates (E52)Undesirable outcomes (e.g., trapped at zero lower bound or abandonment of national currency) (E49)

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