Working Paper: NBER ID: w26119
Authors: Sandro Ambuehl; B. Douglas Bernheim; Axel Ockenfels
Abstract: We study experimentally when, why, and how people intervene in others' choices. Choice Architects (CAs) construct opportunity sets containing bundles of time-indexed payments for Choosers. CAs frequently prevent impatient choices despite opportunities to provide advice, believing Choosers benefit. We consider several hypotheses concerning CAs' motives. A conventional behavioral welfarist acts as a correctly informed social planner; a mistakes-projective paternalist removes options she wishes she could reject when choosing for herself; an ideals-projective paternalist seeks to align others' choices with her own aspirations. Ideals-projective paternalism provides the best explanation for interventions in the laboratory and rationalizes support for actual paternalistic policies.
Keywords: paternalism; behavioral economics; choice architecture
JEL Codes: P43; P48
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| choice architects' decisions (D87) | choosers' well-being (I31) |
| choice architects' belief in benefits of interventions (D91) | choice architects' imposition of restrictions on choosers (D10) |
| patience of choice architects (G11) | imposition of patience on choosers (D81) |
| susceptibility to false consensus effect (C92) | tendency for ideals-projective paternalism (D64) |
| frontend delay in decision problems (C44) | likelihood of interventions (I24) |